Identifying Barriers to the Development of Learning Organizations in Iraq’s Public Sector: A Study of the South Electricity Production Company in Basra Province

Abstract

Objective: This study aimed to systematically identify and explain the barriers to developing a learning organization in Iraq’s public sector, focusing on the South Electricity Production Company in Basra Province.

Methodology: This applied study adopted a qualitative, exploratory design. The participants comprised 19 senior managers, middle-level supervisors, and experienced employees of the South Electricity Production Company, selected through purposive and snowball sampling. Data were collected through semi-structured interviews and analyzed using Braun and Clarke’s thematic analysis. The coding and analytical process generated 133 initial codes, 63 secondary codes, 21 subthemes, and five overarching themes.

Findings: The thematic analysis indicated that barriers to becoming a learning organization were organized into five interconnected domains: bureaucracy and centralization, inadequate human capacity and leadership, discontinuities in learning and knowledge transfer, political intervention and managerial instability, and operational and infrastructural constraints. Centralized decision-making and bureaucratic dominance restricted organizational autonomy, experimentation, and innovation, while weaknesses in leadership and human-resource development constrained the activation and utilization of employee knowledge. Inadequate documentation and knowledge-sharing mechanisms prevented individual experience from being transformed into organizational memory. Political intervention and managerial turnover disrupted continuity in learning and developmental initiatives, whereas resource, technological, and operational constraints reduced opportunities for organizational reflection and innovation. Importantly, these barriers did not operate independently; rather, they formed a mutually reinforcing cycle in which structural and operational pressures diminished learning capacity, while weak organizational learning further reduced the organization’s ability to address underlying problems effectively.

Conclusion: Developing a learning organization in Iraq’s public sector requires simultaneous, multilevel reforms in decision-making structures, leadership and human capital, knowledge management and transfer, managerial stability, and operational infrastructure. Isolated interventions such as employee training are unlikely to be sufficient unless learning is institutionally embedded in organizational processes linking experience, knowledge, decision-making, and corrective action.